

ALIYA R. DEWEY

CONTACT	aliyardewey@arizona.edu aliyadewey.com pronouns: she/her	PAIR Centre Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg Werner-von-Siemens-Str. 61 91052 Erlangen, Germany
SPECIALIZATIONS	general philosophy of science philosophy of neuroscience & cognitive science philosophy of artificial intelligence	
COMPETENCIES	ethics & metaethics philosophy, politics, & economics (PPE) moral psychology	
EMPLOYMENT	Assistant Professor (starting 2025) Department of Philosophy University of Texas at El Paso Postdoctoral Associate (2024–2025) Centre for Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh Postdoctoral Research Fellow (2023–2024) Centre for Philosophy & Artificial Intelligence Research University of Erlangen-Nuremberg	
EDUCATION	PhD	Philosophy, neuroscience (doctoral minor), & cognitive science (doctoral minor), University of Arizona (2017–2023)
	MA	Philosophy, York University (2015–2016)
	BBA	Schulich School of Business, York University (2010–2014)
JOURNAL ARTICLES	Anatomy's role in mechanistic explanations of organism behaviour. Forthcoming in <i>Synthese</i> . In praise of animals. (with Rhys Borchert) <i>Biology & Philosophy</i> , 38.24 (2023). [doi] Metacognitive control in single- vs. dual-process theory. <i>Thinking & Reasoning</i> , 29.2 (2023): 177–212. [doi] Arbitrating norms for reasoning tasks. <i>Synthese</i> , 200 (2022): 502. [doi] Anthropomorphism and anthropectomy as friendly competitors. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 30.7 (2017): 970–91. [doi] A dual systems theory of incontinent action. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 30.7 (2017): 925–44. [doi]	

BOOK CHAPTERS	<p>Temporal dynamics of moral decision-making. (w/ Corey Allen & Katherine Boere) Invited for F. De Brigard & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Eds.), <i>Neuroscience & Philosophy, Volume 2</i>.</p>
BOOK REVIEWS	<p>Balancing the evidential scale for the mental unconscious. Review of <i>Open minded: Searching for the truth about the unconscious mind</i> by Newell & Shanks. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i>.</p>
COMMENTARIES	<p>Pressing Christie et al.'s (2023) objection: Why single out selected effects? Forthcoming in <i>Australasian Philosophical Review</i>.</p> <p>Categorizing judgments as likely to be selected by intuition or deliberation. <i>Behavioral & Brain Sciences</i>, 46.E118 (2023). [doi]</p> <p>Reframing single- and dual-process theories as cognitive models: Commentary on De Neys (2021). <i>Perspectives on Psychological Science</i>, 16.6 (2021): 1428–31. [doi]</p>
GRANTS, HONOURS, & AWARDS	<p>Summer Seminar in Neuroscience and Philosophy (SSNAP), Duke University 2023 Co-principal investigator on “<i>A multilevel neural framework of self-processing</i>” project, an fMRI experiment at Marco Iacoboni’s lab at the University of California, Los Angeles, USA (\$30,000 USD)</p> <p>2023 Co-principal investigator on “<i>Temporal dynamics of conflict detection in moral decision-making</i>” project, an EEG experiment at Olav Krigolson’s lab at the University of Victoria, Canada (\$20,000 USD)</p> <p>2023 Fellowship (\$1,000 USD)</p> <p>Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University 2023 Junior Fellowship (\$6,000 USD) 2022 George W. Gibbs Grant (\$6,000 USD) 2018–2022 Graduate Fellowships (\$11,500 USD) 2018 Hayek Travel Grant (\$400 USD)</p> <p>Philosophy of Animal Minds & Behaviour Association (PAMBA) Best Essay Prize for “<i>In praise of animals</i>” with Rhys Borchert (\$3,000 CAD)</p> <p>Moral Narratives Workshop, Princeton University 2022 Fellowship (\$500 USD)</p> <p>Herbert Carter Travel Award, University of Arizona 2022 award for interdisciplinary presentation (\$400 USD)</p> <p>Centre for the Philosophy of Freedom, University of Arizona 2017 Doctoral Fellowship (\$8,500 USD)</p> <p>Government of Ontario, Canada 2017 Graduate Scholarship (\$15,000 CAD, declined)</p>

Kitty & Lou Newman Memorial, York University
2016 Graduate Scholarship (\$12,000 CAD)

Graduate Scholarship, York University
2015–2016 Graduate Scholarship (\$9,000 CAD)

Department of Mathematics, York University
2013–2014 Chair's Honour Roll

SELECTED TALKS

(*) Refereed

Temporal dynamics of moral decision-making. (presenting w/ Corey Allen)
Summer Seminars in Neuroscience & Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC, August 2024.

Ideological propositions & ideology critique. (presenting w/ Anna-Bella Sicilia)
Social Ontology, Duke University, Durham, NC, July 2024.

Why cognition can't be reverse engineered from behaviour.
3rd Luxembourg Workshop on AI & Epistemology, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Jun 2024.
Dubrovnik Philosophy of Science Conference, Inter-University Centre, Dubrovnik, Croatia, Apr 2024.
**Southern Society for Philosophy & Psychology*, Cincinnati, OH, March 2024.
**Issues in Philosophy of Memory 3.5*, online, Oct 2024.

Rationalizing behaviour as reasons responsive.
**Central Division of the American Philosophical Association*, New Orleans, LA, Feb 2024.

Can animals be moral agents? (presenting w/ Rhys Borchert)
Philosophy of Animal Minds & Behaviour Association, Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, New Orleans, LA, Feb 2024.

Anatomy's role in behavioural explanation.
**International Society for the Philosophy of the Sciences of the Mind*, online, Nov 2023.
**Philosophy of Science Association*, Pittsburgh, PA, Nov 2022.
**Society for Philosophy & Psychology*, online, Jun 2021.

(Basal) memory as sensitivity to backward-facing concerns. (presenter, co-authored w/ Urté Laukaitytė)
*Unconventional Memory Workshop, *Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy*, LMU Munich, Munich, Sep 2023.

Prediction and planning in complex political systems. (presenter, co-authored with Travis Quigley)
Political Theory Seminar, *University of Bamberg*, Bamberg, DE, Oct 2023.
Junior Fellowship Workshop, *Institute for Humane Studies*, Raleigh, North Carolina, May & Aug 2023 [two sessions].
Graduate Workshop, *Institute for Humane Studies*, online, Apr 2022.
Graduate Workshop, *Institute for Humane Studies*, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, Oct 2019.

In praise of animals (presenting with Rhys Borchert).

**Philosophy of Animal Minds & Behaviour Association, Madrid, Apr 2023.*

Irreducible normativity in biological functions.

**Society for Metaphysics of Science, Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Montréal, QC, Jan 2023.*

Reasoning improvements after cognitive control: Frontoparietal network under phasic inhibition through the hyperdirect pathway.

**Society for Neuroscience, San Diego, CA, Nov 2022 [poster].*

Moral psychology's normativism dilemma.

**Southern Society for Philosophy & Psychology, Mobile, AL, Mar 2022.*

**Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, online, Jan 2022.*

Graduate Workshop, Institute for Humane Studies, online, Mar 2021.

Undergraduate philosophy club, Florida State University, online, Oct 2020.

Astrobiological reasons for climate change.

**Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder, CO, Aug 2022.*

Metacognitive control in single- vs. dual-process theory.

**Society for Judgment & Decision-Making, online, Feb 2022 [poster].*

**Southern Society for Philosophy & Psychology, online, Dec 2020.*

A realist answer to the relevance question.

**USC/UCLA Annual Graduate Conference, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, Mar 2019.*

**Canadian Philosophical Association, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, QC, Jun 2018.*

Autonomy without a self.

**Uehiro Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, HI, Mar 2018.*

**Canadian Philosophical Association, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, May 2016.*

Metacognitivism.

Graduate Workshop, Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, Nov 2017.

**Morality, Moral Philosophy, & the Humanities in the Age of Neuroscience, Kent State University, Kent, OH, Nov 2016.*

Anthropomorphism and anthropectomy as friendly competitors.

Philosophy Graduate Conference, York University, Toronto, ON, Apr 2016.

An integrated theory of knowledge how.

**Canadian Society for Epistemology, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Nov 2015.*

TEACHING

Lead Instructor (all online courses)

Law & morality (*1 session*: winter 2022)

Neuroethics (*4 sessions*: fall 2019–2022, winter 2021)

Consciousness & cognition (3 sessions: summer 2018, 2022, spring 2020)
Moral thought (2 sessions: winter 2019, spring 2021)
Ethics & economics (10 sessions: winter 2018; summer 2019–2022)

Teaching Assistant (all in-person courses)

Ethics & economics of wealth creation; Mario Villareal-Diaz (fall 2018)
Mind, matter, & God; Christopher Maloney (fall 2017, spring 2019)
Logic & critical thinking; Jonathan Weinberg (fall 2017)
Introduction to ethics; Julie Allen (summer 2017)
Introduction to philosophy; Alexandru Manafu (2016–2017)

Junior Supervisor, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Ibifuro Jaja, philosophy, PhD (Jan 2024–current)

SERVICE

Co-Organizer (with Vincent C. Müller, Leonard Dung, Guido Löhr), 5th Biennial Conference on “*Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence*”, PAIR Centre, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Bavaria, Germany (Dec 2023)

Editorial Assistant (with Mark Timmons), *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics* (spring 2022, 2023)

Organizing Committee (reviewer and commentator), *Arizona Feminist Philosophy Graduate Conference*, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA (spring 2019, 2022, 2023)

Research Assistant (with Muhammad Ali Khalidi), philosophy of memory research project (2015–2016)

REVIEWING

Philosophical Psychology, Perspectives in Psychological Science, Minds & Machines, Phenomenology & the Cognitive Sciences

DISSERTATION
ABSTRACT

Robust Normativity in Complexity Science

I defend the surprising claim that scientists often do—and always should—reason about complex adaptive systems as if they were bound by normative standards that exist independently of (a) the scientists’ own normative commitments and (b) the actual features of the complex adaptive systems (including their own normative commitments, if they’re capable of such). Following David Enoch, I refer to such standards as “robustly normative”. Chapters 1 and 2 show that molecular biologists and neuroethologists reason as though certain kinds of functions and mechanisms, respectively, are robustly normative. Chapters 3 and 4 show that (a) psychologists who study logical and moral reasoning, respectively, do not reason as though rationality were robustly normative and (b) this creates deep problems that cannot be solved unless they do reason as though rationality were robustly normative. Through my dissertation, I suggest an even stronger, metaphysical claim: that scientists always should reason about complex adaptive systems as if they were bound by robust norms because they are, in fact, bound by robust norms.

Committee: Sara Aronowitz (co-chair), Mark Timmons (co-chair), Jonathan Weinberg, Allen Buchanan.

GRADUATE
COURSEWORK

Neuroscience (doctoral minor)

Systems neuroscience; Andrew Fuglevand; Shaowen Bao, Haijiang Cai, Stephen Cowen, Erika Eggers, Jean-Marc Fellous, Ralph Fregosi, & Katalin Gothard (spring 2020)

Neuroscience colloquium; Konrad Zinsmaier (spring 2020)

Principles of molecular & cellular neuroscience; Konrad Zinsmaier, Andrew Fuglevand, & Lalitha Madhavan (fall 2019)

Cognitive science (doctoral minor)

Cognitive neuroscience of consciousness; Eve Isham (spring 2019)

Fundamentals of statistics: Coding in R; Stephen Cowen (fall 2018)

Introduction to cognitive science; Mary Peterson (spring 2018)

Cognitive science colloquium; Mary Peterson (2017–2018, fall 2018)

Judgment & decision-making; Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini & Martin Reimann (fall 2017)

Philosophy of cognitive science (specialization)

Mental representation; Jonathan Weinberg (spring 2019)

Philosophy of Jerry Fodor; Jonathan Weinberg (spring 2018)

Reductionism & emergentism; Muhammad Ali Khalidi (fall 2016)

Evolution of human cognition; David Jopling (spring 2016) (audit)

Mindreading in non-human animals; Kristin Andrews (spring 2016)

Moral philosophy (competence)

Metaethics reading group; Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2017–2022)

Early modern ethics; Mark Timmons (spring 2018)

Metaethics; Mark Timmons (fall 2017)

Internalism/externalism about reasons; Robert Myers (spring 2017)

Philosophy of love; Alice MacLachlan (spring 2017)

Moral practice; Kristin Andrews & Alice MacLachlan (fall 2016)

Constructivism & constitutivism; Robert Myers (summer 2016)

Autonomy & welfare; Susan Dimock (fall 2015)

Egalitarianism; Louis-Philippe Hodgson (fall 2015)

Practical philosophy; Alice MacLachlan & Robert Myers (fall 2015)

Other areas of philosophy

Topics in epistemology; Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña (fall 2018)

History of the philosophy of language; Marga Reimer (spring 2018)

Causation; Carolina Sartorio (fall 2017)

Philosophy of action; Robert Myers (spring 2016)

Theoretical philosophy; Verena Gottschling & Judy Pelham (spring 2016)

REFERENCES

Sara Aronowitz

Assistant Professor

Department of Philosophy

University of Toronto

s.aronowitz@utoronto.ca

Mark Timmons

Professor

Department of Philosophy

University of Arizona

mtimmons@arizona.edu

Jonathan Weinberg

Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Arizona
jmweinberg@arizona.edu

Wim De Neys

Research Director (Psychology)
National Centre for Scientific Research
Université de Paris
wim.de-neys@u-paris.fr

Tom Christiano (teaching)

Professor & Department Head
Department of Philosophy
University of Arizona
thomasc@arizona.edu