I earned a BBA with specialisation in economics at York University in Canada (2014) and worked briefly in foreign exchange. An interest in persistent moral disagreements brought me back to academia. I completed an MA in philosophy at York University (2016) and a PhD in philosophy at the University of Arizona (2023). I initially prepared a dissertation on semantic approaches to moral realism, which individuate moral facts as the representational targets (or accuracy conditions) of our moral judgments (where moral facts can be naturalised iff representation can be naturalised).
My interests in representation led me to pursue doctoral minor in neuroscience. I noticed that the cognitive sciences are replete with normative categories like success vs. error, rationality vs. irrationality, and functionality vs. dysfunctionality. Since then, my research has become what I’d describe as “metaethically-flavoured” philosophy of science. I more or less directly explore the roles normative categories both do and should play in the cognitive sciences. Eventually, I hope to bridge philosophy of science and metaethics by arguing that a moderate form of scientific realism (one that is realist about normativity’s roles in cognitive science) implies a surprisingly robust form of normative realism.
Outside of academic life, I like to cook Desi food, bake vegan desserts, do road trips, hike, climb, weightlift, and go to music festivals. I’ve lived in Canada, USA, Singapore, and Germany. I visit Pakistan or India about every year or two.